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Abstract
We study the problem of providing privacy-
preserving access to an outsourced honest-but-
curious data repository for a group of trusted users.
We show that such privacy-preserving data access is
possible using a combination of probabilistic encryp-
tion, which directly hides data values, and stateless
oblivious RAM simulation, which hides the pattern
of data accesses. We give simulations that have only
an O(log n) amortized time overhead for simulating
a RAM algorithm, A, that has a memory of size n,
using a scheme that is data-oblivious with very high
probability assuming the simulation has access to a
private workspace of size O(nν), for any given fixed
constant ν > 0. This simulation makes use of pseudo-
random hash functions and is based on a novel hier-
archy of cuckoo hash tables that all share a common
stash. We also provide results from an experimental
simulation of this scheme, showing its practicality.
In addition, in a result that may be of some theo-
retical interest, we also show that one can eliminate
the dependence on pseudorandom hash functions in
our simulation while having the overhead rise to be
O(log2 n).
1 Introduction
Companies offering outsourced data storage services
are defining a growing industry, with competitors
that include Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, which
are providing outsourced data repositories for indi-
vidual or corporate users, with prices that amount to
pennies per gigabyte stored.
Clearly, the customers of such cloud computing ser-
vices have an interest in security and privacy, par-
ticularly for proprietary data. As a recognition of
this interest, we note that, as of November 2010,
the Amazon S3 and Microsoft Azure cloud platform
have achieved ISO 27001 certification and Google’s
cloud computing service has SAS70 certification. In
spite of these certifications, the companies that pro-
vide outsourced data services nevertheless often have
commercial interests in learning information about
their customers’ data. Thus, the users of such sys-
tems should also consider technological solutions for
maintaining the privacy of their outsourced data in
addition to the assurances that come from certifica-
tions and formal audits.
Of course, a key component for users to main-
tain the privacy of their data is for them to store
their data in encrypted form, e.g., using a group key
known only to the set of users. Simply encrypting
the group’s data is not sufficient to achieve privacy,
however, since information about the data may be
leaked by the pattern in which the users access it.
For example, at the Oakland 2010 conference, Chen
et al. [8] show that highly sensitive data, such as fi-
nancial and health information, can be inferred from
access patterns at popular financial and health web
sites even if the contents of those communications are
encrypted.
1.1 Group Access to Outsourced Data
In this paper, we are interested in technological so-
lutions to the problem of protecting the privacy of a
group’s data accesses to an outsourced data storage
facility. In this framework, we assume that a trusted
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group, G, of users shares a group key, K, with which
they encrypt all their shared data that is stored at a
semi-trusted data outsourcer, Bob. Furthermore, we
assume that the users access their data according to
a public indexing scheme, which Bob knows; hence,
we can model Bob’s memory, M , as in the standard
RAM model (e.g., see [1, 9, 14, 18]).
Each time a user, Alice, in G, accesses Bob’s mem-
ory, she specifies an index i, and Bob responds with
C = M [i]. Alice then performs the following (atomic)
sequence of operations:
1. She decrypts C using K, producing the plaintext
value, P = DK(C), that was stored in encrypted
form at index i by Bob.
2. She optionally changes the value of P , depending
on the computation she is performing, producing
the plaintext value, P ′.
3. She encrypts P ′ using a probabilistic encryption
scheme based on K, producing ciphertext C ′ =
EK(P
′).
4. She returns C ′ to Bob for him to store back in
his memory at index i; that is, she directs Bob
to assign M [i]← C ′.
By using a probabilistic encryption scheme, the users
in the group G ensure that Bob is computationally
unable to determine the plaintext of any memory cell
from that cell’s contents alone. Also, it is unfeasible
for Bob to determine whether two memory cells store
encryptions of the same plaintext.
1.2 Stateless Oblivious RAM Simula-
tion
In addition to using probabilistic encryption, the
users in the group G also need to hide their data
access patterns from Bob, so as to avoid inadvertent
information leaks. To facilitate such information hid-
ing, we formulate the privacy objective of the users in
G in terms of the stateless oblivious RAM simulation
problem.
In this framework, we model the group G as a sin-
gle user, Alice, who has a register holding the key
K and a CPU with a private cache. Alice’s interac-
tions with Bob occur in discrete episodes in which she
reads and writes a set of cells in his memory, using
probabilistic encryption, as described above, to hide
data contents. Alice’s cache may be used as a private
workspace during any episode, but it cannot store
any information from one episode to the next. This
requirement is meant to model the fact that Alice is
representing a group of users who do not communi-
cate outside of their shared access to Bob’s memory.
That is, each episode could model a consecutive set
of accesses from different users in the group G. More-
over, this requirement is what makes this framework
“stateless,” in that no state can be carried from one
episode to the next (other than the state that is main-
tained by Bob).
To allow the group of users, which we model by the
stateless Alice, to perform arbitrary computations on
the data they share and outsource to Bob, we assume
that Alice is simulating a RAM computation. We also
assume the service provider, Bob, is trying to learn as
much as possible about the contents of Alice’s data
from the sequence and location of all of Alice’s mem-
ory accesses. As mentioned above, however, he can-
not see the content of what is read or written (since
it is probabilistically encrypted). Moreover, Bob has
no access to Alice’s private cache. Bob is assumed to
be an honest-but-curious adversary [12], in that he
correctly performs all protocols and does not tamper
with data.
We say that Alice’s sequence of memory accesses
is data-oblivious if the distribution of this sequence
depends only on n, the size of the memory used by
the RAM algorithm she is simulating, m, the size
of her private cache, and the length of the access se-
quence itself. In particular, the distribution of Alice’s
memory accesses should be independent of the data
values in the input. Put another way, this definition
means that Pr(S |M), the probability that Bob sees
an access sequence, S, conditioned on a specific con-
figuration of his memory, M , satisfies
Pr(S |M) = Pr(S |M ′),
for any memory configuration M ′ 6= M such that
|M ′| = |M |.
Examples of data-oblivious access sequences for an
array, A, of size n, in Bob’s memory, include the fol-
lowing:
• Scanning A from beginning to end, accessing
each item exactly once, for instance, to compute
the minimum value in A, which is then stored in
A[1].
• Simulating a Boolean circuit, C, with its inputs
taken in order from the bits of A.
• Accessing the cells of A according to a ran-
dom hash function, h(i), as A[h(1)], A[h(2)],
. . ., A[h(n)], or random permutation, pi(i), as
A[pi(1)], A[pi(2)], . . ., A[pi(n)].
Examples of computations on A that would not be
data-oblivious include the following:
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• Scanning A from beginning to end, accessing
each item exactly once, to compute the index
i of the minimum value in A, and then reading
A[i] and writing it to A[1].
• Using a standard heap-sort, merge-sort, or quick-
sort algorithm to sort A. (None of these well-
known algorithms is data-oblivious.)
• Using values in A as indices for a hash table, T ,
and accessing them as T [h(A[1])], T [h(A[2])], . . .,
T [h(A[n])], where h is a random hash function.
For example, consider what happens if the values
in A are all equal and how unlikely the resulting
collision in T would be.
Note that this last example access pattern actually
would be data-oblivious if the elements in A were al-
ways guaranteed to be distinct, assuming the random
hash function, h, satisfies the standard assumptions
of the random oracle model (e.g., see [6]).
1.3 Related Prior Results
Data-oblivious sorting is a fundamental problem
(e.g., see Knuth [19]), with deterministic schemes giv-
ing rise to sorting networks, such as the impracti-
cal O(n log n) AKS network [2, 3, 25, 29] as well as
practical, but theoretically-suboptimal, sorting net-
works [20, 28]. Randomized data-oblivious sorting al-
gorithms running in O(n log n) time and succeeding
with high probability1 are studied by Leighton and
Plaxton [21] and Goodrich [15]. In addition, data-
oblivious sorting is finding applications to privacy-
preserving secure multi-party computations [30], and
it is used in all the known oblivious RAM simulation
schemes (including the ones in this paper).
In early work on the topic of oblivious simula-
tion, Pippenger and Fischer [27] show that one can
simulate a Turing machine computation of length
n with an oblivious Turing machine computation of
length O(n log n), that is, they achieve an amortized
O(log n) time and space overhead for this oblivious
simulation.
More recently, Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13] show
that a RAM computation using space n can be simu-
lated with an oblivious RAM with an amortized time
overhead of O(log3 n) per step of the original RAM
algorithm and space overhead of O(log n). Goodrich
and Mitzenmacher [16] improve this result by showing
that any RAM algorithm, A, can be simulated in a
data-oblivious fashion, with very high probability, in
1In this paper, we take the phrase “with very high proba-
bility” to mean that the probability is at least 1 − O(1/nd),
for any given fixed constant d ≥ 1.
an outsourced memory so that each memory access
performed by A has a time overhead of O(log2 n),
assuming Alice’s private cache has size O(1). Their
scheme has a space overhead of O(1). Incidentally,
in the recent CRYPTO 2010 conference, Pinkas and
Reinman [26] also claim an oblivious RAM simula-
tion result having a time overhead of O(log2 n), but
there is a flaw in this version of their scheme2.
In addition to these stateless oblivious RAM sim-
ulation schemes, Williams and Sion [31] show how to
simulate a RAM computation with an oblivious RAM
where the data owner, Alice, has a stateful private
memory of size O(
√
n), achieving an expected amor-
tized time overhead of O(log2 n) using O(n log n)
memory at the data provider. In addition, Williams
et al. [32] claim a method that uses an O(
√
n)-sized
private cache and has O(log n log log n) amortized
time overhead, but Pinkas and Reinman [26] have
raised concerns with the assumptions and analysis of
this result.
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [16] provide a stateful
RAM simulation scheme that achieves an overhead
of O(log n) and is oblivious with very high probabil-
ity. Their scheme assumes that Alice maintains state
from one episode to the next in a private cache of size
O(nν), for any given fixed constant ν > 0. Boneh et
al. [7] also propose a scheme that uses a state. They
achieve an amortized overhead of O(1) but using a
state of size O(
√
n log n). However, this state is es-
sential to the efficiency of both simulation schemes.
Thus, these methods are not applicable to the prob-
lem of providing privacy-preserving group access to
an outsourced data repository.
Returning to stateless oblivious RAM simulation,
we note that Ajtai [4] has a recent oblivious RAM
simulation result that shows that a polylogarithmic
factor overhead in time and space is possible with-
out cryptographic assumptions about the existence
of random hash functions, as is done in the previous
oblivious RAM simulation cited above. Damg˚ard et
al. [10] improve this result further, showing that a
time overhead of O(log3 n) is possible for oblivious
RAM simulation without using random functions.
In addition to the above-mentioned upper-bound
results, Beame and Machmouchi [5] show that if the
additional space utilized in the simulation (besides
the space for the data itself) is sufficiently sublinear,
then the overhead for oblivious RAM simulation has
a superlogarithmic lower bound. Such bounds don’t
2The scheme of Pinkas and Reinman allows the adversary,
Bob, to distinguish with high probability an access sequence
that reads the same memory location over and over from one
that accesses each memory cell exactly once. This flaw is ex-
pected to be repaired in the journal version of their paper.
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Table 1: Comparison of Oblivious RAM simulations.
User
Memory
User State
Size
Server Storage
Amortized Access
Overhead
Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13] O(1) - O(n log n) O(log3 n)
Williams and Sion [31] O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(n log n) O(log2 n)
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [16] (1) O(1) - O(n) O(log2 n)
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [16] (2) O(nν) O(nν) O(n) O(log n)
Boneh et al. [7] O(
√
n log n) O(
√
n log n) O(n) O(1)
Our result O(nν) - O(n) O(log n)
Our result (w/o random oracle) O(nν) - O(n) O(log2 n)
apply, of course, to a simulation that uses O(n) addi-
tional memory, as is common in the efficient schemes
mentioned above.
We provide a summary of the Oblivious RAM sim-
ulation schemes and compare with ours in Table 1.3.
Note that the schemes that maintain a state cannot
be used to hide a pattern of access by a group of users
which is one of the challenges we address in this pa-
per.
1.4 Our Results
We give an efficient method for simulating any RAM
algorithm, A, in a stateless fashion with a time over-
head of O(log n) and space overhead of O(1), using an
access sequence that is data-oblivious with very high
probability, where n is the size of the RAM memory.
Our methods assume that Alice has a private cache of
of size O(nν), for any given fixed constant ν > 0, but
she uses this cache only as a private “scratch space”
to support computations she performs during each
episode. Alice is not allowed to maintain state in her
private memory from one episode to the next. Thus,
this simulation scheme is applicable to the problem
of simulating access to a shared data repository by
a group of cooperating users that all share a secret
key. Moreover, the assumption about the size of Al-
ice’s scratch space is motivated by the fact that even
handheld devices have a reasonable amount of local
memory. For example, if we were to set ν = 1/4,
then our simulation would allow a collection of de-
vices having memories with sizes on the order of one
megabyte to support privacy-preserving access to an
outsourced data repository whose size is on the order
of one yottabyte.
Like the previous oblivious RAM simulation
schemes mentioned above, our scheme uses a hier-
archy of hash tables, together with a small set of
pseudorandom hash functions, to obfuscate the ac-
cess pattern of the algorithm A (which need not be
specified in advance). The main idea of our scheme is
to maintain these hash tables as cuckoo hash tables
that all share a single stash of size O(log n). While
conceptually simple, this approach requires a new,
non-trivial analysis for a set of cuckoo tables sharing
a common stash. In addition, an important techni-
cal detail that simplifies our construction is that we
make no use of so-called “dummy” elements, whereas
the previous schemes used such elements.
In practice, the set of pseudorandom hash func-
tions could be implemented using, e.g., keyed SHA-
256 functions [11]. Nevertheless, we also show that
our construction can be used to simulate a RAM com-
putation with an overhead of O(log2 n) without the
use of pseudorandom functions, which may be of some
theoretical interest.
Finally, we provide experimental results for a sim-
ulation of our scheme, which show the practical effec-
tiveness of the approach of using a shared stash. In
particular, our experimental prototype simulates the
dynamic evolution of the hierarchy of hash tables and
our experimental analysis shows the threshold values
at which the shared stash becomes effective.
2 Theory Background
For our results, we rely on general methods for data-
oblivious simulation of a non-oblivious algorithm on
a RAM. As mentioned above, the seminal theoreti-
cal framework for such simulations was presented by
Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13], who store keys in a hi-
erarchy of hash tables of increasing size, each being
twice the size of the previous one. For n items there
are O(log n) levels, each level being a standard hash
table with 2i buckets for some i, and each bucket
containing up to O(log n) keys in order to cope with
collisions within the hash table. In this construction
the total size of all the tables is O(n log n). To per-
form a lookup, the first level is scanned sequentially,
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and in each of the other levels, a bucket chosen by
the hash function for that level acting on the key
(or, if the item is found at an earlier level, a random
dummy key) is scanned. The item is subsequently re-
encrypted and re-inserted into the first level. It is im-
portant to note that at all levels a bucket is scanned
even if the key is found early, to maintain oblivious-
ness. As levels fill, keys must be shifted down to
subsequent levels. The details of the original scheme
are rather complex; for further details see the original
paper [13].
Recently, a more efficient simulation approach for
this problem was outlined by Goodrich and Mitzen-
macher [16]. The primary difference in this new line
of work is the use of cuckoo hash tables in place the
standard hash tables used originally in [13]. We
therefore now present some background on cuckoo
hashing.
As introduced by Pagh and Rodler [24], in standard
cuckoo hashing we utilize two tables, each with m
cells, with each cell capable of holding a single key.
We make use of two hash functions h1 and h2. We
assume that the hash functions can be modeled as
completely random hash functions. The tables store
up to n items, where m = n(1 + ) for some constant
 > 0, yielding a load of (just) less than 1/2; keys
can be inserted or deleted over time as long as this
restriction is maintained.
A key x (which we may also refer to as an “item”
or “element”) that is stored in the hash tables must
be located at either h1(x) or h2(x). As there are only
two possible locations for a key, lookups take constant
time. To insert a new key x, we place x in the cell
h1(x). If the cell had been empty, the operation is
complete. Otherwise, key y previously in the cell is
moved to h2(y). This may in turn require another
key to be moved, and so on, until a key is placed
in an empty cell. We say that a failure occurs if,
for an appropriate constant c, after c log n steps this
process has not successfully terminated. Suppose we
insert an nth key into the system. It is known that:
• The expected time to insert a new key is bounded
above by a constant (that depends on ).
• The probability that a new key causes a failure is
Θ(1/n2) (where the notation hides a dependence
on ).
See Figures 1 and 2 for examples.
Before considering ways to reduce the probabil-
ity of failures to something more suitable, we briefly
mention that there are several natural variations of
cuckoo hashing, many of which are described in a sur-
vey article by Mitzenmacher [22]. Variations include
A B F C 
E D 
G 
E G B F C 
A D 
Figure 1: The top of the figure represents a cuckoo
hash table. Keys are placed in one subtable; the ar-
row for each key points to the alternate location for
the key in the other subtable. Key G is inserted,
leading to the movement of several other keys for G
to be placed, as shown in the bottom of the figure.
A B C 
E D F 
G 
Figure 2: Key G is to be inserted, but it cannot be
placed successfully. (Seven keys have only six loca-
tions.) This leads to a failure, or if there is a stash,
then G can be placed in a stash.
using more than two choices, using cells that hold
more than one key, and so on. For our purposes, it
suffices to understand standard cuckoo hashing, along
with idea of a stash [17].
A stash represents additional memory where keys
that would cause a failure can be placed in order to
avoid the failure; with a stash, a failure occurs only
if the stash itself overflows. As shown in [17], the
failure probability when inserting the nth key into
a cuckoo hash table can be reduced to O(1/nk+2)
for any constant k by using a stash that can hold
k keys. Using this allows us to use cuckoo hash ta-
bles for any polynomially bounded number of inserts
and deletions using only a constant-sized stash. To
search for an item, we must search both the two table
locations and the k stash locations. In the context of
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oblivious simulation, we can search the stash simply
by reading each stash location.
As we have stated, however, in order to perform our
oblivious simulation, we will make use of a hierarchy
of cuckoo hash tables to hold n items. The small-
est of these hash tables may be much smaller than
n, which can lead to problems in our setting3. For
example, if the smallest hash table is of size x, then
even using a stash of size k leads to a failure probabil-
ity of O(1/xk+2). If x is for example polylogarithmic
in n, then for any constant k, the failure probability
is Ω(1/n), and therefore over the insertion of n items,
we would expect failures to occur. In order to deal
with this problem, Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [16]
extend the analysis of [17] to stashes of logarithmic
size, showing that even for suitably large table sizes
x that are only polylogarithmic in n, and stashes of
size k = O(log n), the failure probability is O(x−αk)
for a suitable constant k. This suffices to yield super-
polynomially small failure rates.
In fact, we need to extend this result even fur-
ther here. In [16], Goodrich and Mitzenmacher use a
logarithmic-sized stash at each level. We explain here
that it suffices to use a single logarithmic-sized stash
for all levels. That is, while there’s a non-trivial prob-
ability of at least one layer in our hierarchy requiring
a stash of size Ω(1), over the logarithmic number of
layers only a stash of logarithmic size is actually nec-
essary. We will use this in our construction in Sec-
tion 3. We now briefly explain why, if we consider
the sum of the number of items placed in the stash
at all possible levels in our construction, this will be
at most O(log n) with high probability.
The key is the following argument. As shown in
[16], at a level of size x cells (where x is Ω(log7 n)),
the probability that the stash for that level exceeds a
total size s is x−Ω(s). Further, as long as the hashes
for each level in our construction are independent,
we can treat the required stash size at each level is
independent, since the number of items placed in the
stash at a level is then a random variable dependent
only on the number of items appearing in that level.
Now consider any point of our construction and
let Si be the number of items at the ith level that
need to be put in the stash. It is apparent that Si
has mean less than 1 and tails that can be domi-
nated by a geometrically decreasing random variable.
This is sufficient to apply standard Chernoff bounds.
Formally, let X1, X2, . . . , X` be independent random
variables with mean 1 geometrically decreasing tails,
so that Xi = j with probability 1/2
j for j ≥ 1. Then
the calculations of [16] imply that the Xi stochasti-
3This is also at the heart of the flaw in the CRYPTO2010
version of the Pinkas and Reinman paper [26].
cally dominate the Si, and we can now apply standard
Chernoff bounds for these random variables. Specifi-
cally, noting thatXi can be interpreted as the number
of fair coin flips until the first heads, we can think of
the sum of the Xi as being the number of coin flips
until the `th head, and this dominates the number
of items that need to be placed in the stash at any
point. When ` = O(log n), as is the case here as
there are only O(log n) levels of hash tables in our
construction, then for any constant γ1 there exists a
corresponding constant γ2 such that the `th head oc-
curs by the (γ2 log n)’th flip with probability at least
1−1/nγ1 . (See, for example, [23, Chapter 4].) Hence
we can handle any polynomial number of steps with
high probability, using a stash of size only O(log n)
that holds items from all levels of our construction.
3 Simulating a RAM Algo-
rithm Obliviously
In this section, we describe and analyze two schemes
for stateless oblivious RAM simulation.
3.1 Simulation Using Pseudorandom
Functions
We begin with a construction that uses pseudoran-
dom functions and is secure against a polynomially
bounded adversary.
Given a RAM algorithm, A, the main goal of our
oblivious simulation of A is to hide the pattern of
memory accesses that are made by A. As mentioned
in Section 2, we follow the general framework intro-
duced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13], which uses a
hierarchy of hash tables.
Let n be the number of memory cells of the RAM.
We view each such cell as an item consisting of a pair
(x, v), where x ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1} is the index and v is
the corresponding value. Our data structure stored
at the server has three components, illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. The first component is a cache of size O(log n),
denoted by Q. The second component is a hierarchy
of cuckoo hash tables, T = (T1, . . . , TL), where the
size of T1 is twice the size of Q, each table Ti+1 is
twice the size of table Ti, and TL is the first table
in the sequence of size greater than or equal to n.
Thus, L is O(log n). The third component is a stash,
S, shared between all the above cuckoo tables.
RAM items are stored in the data structure in en-
crypted form. We use a semantically secure prob-
abilistic encryption scheme, which results in a dif-
ferent ciphertext for the same item each time it is
re-encrypted. Also, the server is unable to determine
6
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Figure 3: Illustration of the data structure stored at the server for oblivious RAM simulation using pseudo-
random functions. In the access phase of the simulation, all the items in the cache, Q and the stash, S, plus
two items for each cuckoo table Ti are read by the server. The locations accessed by the server are visualized
as gray-filled rectangles.
whether two ciphertexts correspond to the same item.
The stash S is handled in a similar manner whenever
we search in it for an item.
We use a family of pseudorandom functions param-
eterized by a secret value, ki, for each table, Ti, such
that no value ki is revealed to the server. In particu-
lar, ki is stored in encrypted form for each table Ti,
so that each user can read ki, decrypt it, and then
use it to provide the two hash functions, h1 and h2,
employed by the cuckoo table, Ti, to determine the
location of items. In particular, a memory item (x, v)
is mapped to locations h1(x) and h2(x) in Ti by the
cuckoo scheme (and stored in one of these two loca-
tions or in the common stash, S).
The data structure is initialized by storing all the n
RAM items into cuckoo table TL. Each memory ac-
cess defined by algorithmA corresponds to an episode
in our simulation. An episode consists of two phases,
an access phase and a rebuild phase.
Suppose algorithm A calls for an access to memory
item (x, v). The access phase consists of a search for
x in the cache, Q, then in the stash, S, and contin-
ues with a two-cell cuckoo lookup in each of T1 to
TL until we find the first item with index x. Once we
have found this item, we have achieved the goal of our
search, of course. Nevertheless, for the sake of obliv-
iousness, we simulate continuing the search through-
out the entire data structure. Namely, we always
traverse completely Q and S, and we perform two-
cell cuckoo accesses in tables T1 through TL. How-
ever, after the item is found, we simply access two
distinct, independent uniformly chosen random loca-
tions in each remaining cuckoo table.
Once we have completed the access phase, which
takes O(log n) time, we then switch to the rebuild
phase. We begin by adding or replacing a copy of
the found item into cache Q, possibly changing its
value in the case of a write operation. To assure
obliviousness, we exhaustively scan Q in a sequen-
tial manner and re-encrypt and rewrite all its items.
Thus, the server cannot distinguish which item was
accessed and whether it was modified.
We note briefly that if the item is in the stash,
we can obliviously remove it from the stash when
placing it into Q, to help make sure the stash does
not overflow. One natural approach is to have stash
cells have an associated “clean” or “dirty” bit, which
is encrypted along with the rest of the item. A clean
cell can store an item; a dirty cell is currently being
utilized. When an item is found and replaced into Q,
we can set the cell to clean in the stash.
After adding enough items, cache Q will eventually
overflow. We remedy the overflow by moving all the
elements of Q to cuckoo table T1, including those as-
sociated with empty locations. However, in order to
maintain obliviousness, we do not wait for an overflow
to occur and instead perform the move after a number
of accesses equal to the size of Q. The moving down
of elements cascades down through the hierarchy of
cuckoo tables at a fixed schedule by periodically mov-
ing the elements of Ti−1 into Ti at the earliest time
Ti−1 could have become full. Also, suppose that we
are going to move elements into table Ti for the sec-
ond time, then we instead move the elements into
table Ti+1. Moreover, we continue applying this rule
for i = 1, 2, . . ., until we are copying the elements
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into a table for the first time or we reach TL. Thus,
the process of copying elements into a cuckoo table
occurs at deterministic instances, depending only on
the place we currently are at in the access sequence
specified by algorithm A.
In order to move m elements from a table Ti into
a cuckoo hash table Ti+1 obliviously, we use an algo-
rithm of [16] to obliviously sort the items using O(m)
accesses to the outsourced memory, assuming we have
a private workspace of size O(nν), for some constant
ν > 0, and m ≥ log n, which is always true in our
case. This allows us to remove duplicate items and
use another algorithm of [16] to obliviously construct
a cuckoo table of size m and an associated stash, S′,
of size O(log n) in O(m) time, with very high prob-
ability, while utilizing the private workspace of size
O(nν). Given this construction, we then read S and
S′ into our private workspace, remove any duplicates
and merge them into a single stash S (which will suc-
ceed with very high probability, based on the anal-
ysis we have given above), and write S back out in
a straightforward oblivious fashion. Note that in or-
der to assure obliviousness in subsequent lookups, ta-
ble Ti+1 is rebuilt using two new pseudorandom hash
functions selected by the client by replacing parame-
ter ki+1 with a new secret value.
Any access performed in our simulation will even-
tually lead to O(log n) table rebuilds, with each el-
ement in a rebuild being charged with a constant
amount of work; hence, the total amortized over-
head of all rebuild phases is O(log n). Therefore, the
total amortized time overhead of the entire simula-
tion is O(log n). Moreover, it is easy to see that the
space used by the data structure stored at the server
is O(n).
Let us therefore consider the obliviousness of this
scheme. As we have already observed, the rebuild
phase is clearly oblivious, so any potential dependen-
cies on input values would have to come in the access
phase. Recall that in the access phase, we search in
S, Q, and do a two-table cuckoo access in T1, . . . , TL.
Moreover, because we move the found item into Q af-
ter each access, and we switch to performing random
table lookups once we have found the item, we are
guaranteed never to repeat a two-cell cuckoo lookup
in any table, Ti, for the same item x. In addition,
each such lookup is an independent uniformly ran-
dom access to a table (either from our assumption
about h1 and h2 being distinct random hash functions
for each table or because we already found the item
and are making random accesses explicitly). We per-
form O(|Ti|) such lookups before we empty Ti; hence,
the obliviousness of our access sequence depends on
the inability of the adversary, Bob, of telling if we
are doing a search for an actual item or performing
a random access for the sake of obliviousness. That
is, with high probability, Bob should not be able to
determine whether the item was in S, Q, or some Ti
at the point we found it. Note that this ability de-
pends solely on whether or not the O(|Ti|) accesses
we made to Ti, together with searches in the shared
stash S, would correspond to valid cuckoo lookups in
Ti for some set of items. Of course, this is the same
as the event that inserting all these elements into Ti
would form a valid cuckoo table, with shared stash S,
which we have already observed (in Section 2) is an
event that occurs with very high probability. Thus,
our scheme is oblivious with very high probability.
3.2 Simulation Without Pseudoran-
dom Functions
We can adapt our simulation to avoid the use of ran-
dom functions by employing an elegant trick due to
Damg˚ard et al. [10], albeit now further simplified to
avoid the use of dummy nodes, which would add an
extra level of complication that our scheme doesn’t
require.
The main idea is to place a complete binary tree, B,
on top of all the memory cells used in the algorithm
A, and access each memory cell x by performing a
binary search from the root of B to the leaf node cor-
responding to x. That is, we associate each memory
cell item used by A with a leaf of B, define B to
have height dlog ne, and include information at each
internal node v of B so that a search for x can deter-
mine in O(1) time whether to proceed with the left
child or right child of v. In our case, we store each
of the nodes of B in our hierarchy of tables, similar
to what is described above, with the shared stash, S,
the cache, Q, and the set of cuckoo tables, T1 to TL.
(See Figure 4.)
The main difference of this scheme with that given
above is that in this case we no longer use random
hash functions, h1 and h2, to determine the loca-
tions of each element x in a cuckoo table Ti. In-
stead, we simply choose two distinct, independent
uniformly random locations, i1 and i2, in the respec-
tive two sides of Ti and associate these with x as a
tuple (x, i1, i2), which now represents the element x
in our table.
Initially, all the nodes of B are stored in this way
in TL, and for each such internal node v, we include
in v’s record pointers to the two random indices (and
table index) for v’s left child and pointer to the two
random indices (and table index) for v’s right child.
Such pointers can be built obliviously by O(1) calls
to oblivious sorting once we have placed all the nodes
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into TL. Moreover, we will maintain such pointers
throughout our simulation. In addition, we store the
root r of B separately, as it is accessed in every step
of our simulation.
Let us consider, therefore, how an access now oc-
curs. The critical property, which we maintain in-
ductively, is that, for each node v in B, which, say, is
stored in Tj as its earliest (highest) location in our hi-
erarchy, all the ancestors of B are stored in the tables
T1, . . . , Tj , or in r, S, or Q.
Our access for a memory cell x now occurs as a
root-to-leaf search in B. We begin by searching in
r to identify the two random indices and the table
index for each of r’s children. Based on the value
of x, we need to search next for either the left or
right child of r, so let i1 and i2 be the two random
indices for this node, w, and let j be the index of the
highest table Tj storing w (with j = 0 if w ∈ Q and
j = −1 if w ∈ S). We next search in S and Q for
w, and then proceed in T1 through TL. Of course,
we already know the table where we will find w. So,
for each table Tk with k 6= j, we simply access two
random locations in Tk for the sake of obliviousness.
For Tj itself, we look in locations Tj [i1] and Tj [i2] to
find the cell containing the record for w. If w is not a
leaf node, we repeat the above lookup search for the
appropriate child of w that will lead us to the node
storing x.
Once we have done our lookup for x, and have ac-
cessed a root-to-leaf set of nodes,
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wlogn},
in the process, we perform a rebuild phase for W ,
as in the above construction based on random hash
functions, except that we use random locations for all
the nodes we move rather than use random functions.
Note that by our induction hypothesis, if we move a
set of nodes into a table Ti, then all the pointers for
these nodes are either in Ti itself (hence, can be iden-
tified after O(1) calls to oblivious sorting, which takes
O(n) memory accesses by the algorithm of [16]) or at
lower levels in the hierarchy (hence, these pointers
don’t change by our move into Ti). Moreover, all the
nodes of W move as a group. Thus, any root-to-leaf
path in B must be stored in the tables T1 to TL, plus
the queue Q and stash S, in a way that satisfies our
induction hypothesis.
The lookup for an element x now requires search-
ing for O(log n) nodes of B in our hierarchy, which
costs an amortized overhead of O(log n) time each.
Thus, each lookup costs us an amortized overhead
of O(log2 n) time. The obliviousness of this simula-
tion follows from an argument similar to that given
above for the obliviousness for our method that uses
random hash functions. Therefore, we can perform
a stateless oblivious RAM simulation without using
random hash functions with an amortized time over-
head of O(log2 n), assuming a private workspace of
size O(nν) for some constant ν > 0.
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4 Performance
We have implemented a preliminary prototype of our
method for oblivious RAM simulation based on pseu-
dorandom functions (Section 3.1) with the goal of es-
timating the size of the stash S needed to avoid fail-
ures during the rebuild phase. A failure can happen
when we move elements from table Ti to Ti+1 and
the stash overflows, in which case we need to rebuild
table Ti+1. In this section we present experimental
results and show that for a small constant s, a stash
of size s log n is enough to avoid failures.
Our prototype simulates the dynamic evolution of
the hierarchy of hash tables during the access and re-
build phases, omitting the steps that maintain obliv-
iousness (e.g. copying the stash to the client’s side).
We maintain a stash S, a cache Q of size log n and
a hierarchy of O(log n) cuckoo hash tables T1 to TL,
where L is the smallest i such that 2i log n ≥ n. Ti
consists of two hash tables of size (1 + )2i log n with
hash functions hi1 and h
i
2. Every memory access is fol-
lowed by the insertion of the corresponding element
into Q. If the item was retrieved from stash S, it is
first copied to Q and then is removed from S. We
move all the elements of Q to T1 when the number
of performed accesses is a multiple of log n. Simi-
larly, we move all the elements of Ti to Ti+1 when the
number of performed accesses is a multiple of 2i log n.
New hash functions are picked for both tables during
this phase. During the insertion, an item is placed
into the stash if after c log n moves it has not found
an empty cell in the table; we experiment using c = 2.
We insert an item into the stash only if it is not al-
ready present there.
Our prototype is implemented in Java. To
generate hash functions we use a variation of
a method recommended in [11], where hi1(x) =
SHA256(x || seed1i ) mod n, and similarly for hi2.
The seeds are 64-bit long and were obtained using
a SHA256 hash chain starting from an initial seed.
We emphasize that in any implementation of our
method there are various tradeoffs. For example,
increasing the space (that is, using larger values of
) reduces the average time for an insertion and the
failure probability, as it reduces the frequency with
which items have to be put in the stash. Increasing
the stash size reduces the failure probability at the
expense of additional time to examine the stash at
each step. Increasing the number of moves allowed
before placing an item in the stash increases the time
but lowers the failure probability. Our purpose here
is not to explore this broad range of tradeoffs, but to
demonstrate the feasibility of this approach; explor-
ing finer tradeoffs is left as future work.
We ran our simulation for up to 1024K (K = 1000)
RAM items and a varying number of requests. Our
experiments use a value of  of 0.1 and 0.2. For each
experiment we recorded the lowest size of S that is
needed to avoid a failure. In Figures 5 and 6 we show
the fraction of trials out of 1000 that result in the
stash overflow. Comparing the two figures, we see
that overflows happen substantially more frequently
with  = 0.1 than with  = 0.2, as one would expect
since smaller tables lead to more collisions. Indeed,
for  = 0.2 we found a stash size of less than log n
was enough to avoid overflows completely in our lim-
ited experiments. Also, a higher number of requests
requires a slightly bigger stash since rebuilding hap-
pens more often, leading to a larger maximum stash
requirement. While much more extensive experimen-
tation would be needed to determine suitable stash
sizes that would avoid stash overflow for numbers of
trials many orders of magnitude larger, recall that
the probability of an additional item needing to be
placed in a stash in a standard cuckoo table falls very
quickly. We thus expect only slightly larger stash
sizes for such improvements in robustness.
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5 Conclusion
We have given schemes for achieving privacy-
preserving access, with very high probability, to an
outsourced data repository for a group of trusted
users. Our scheme assumes each user has a mod-
est amount of private memory, of size O(nν), for
any given fixed constant ν > 0, which is used as
a workspace for private computation and carries no
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state from one interaction with the data repository to
the next. Assuming the existence of pseudorandom
hash functions, say implemented as keyed SHA-256
functions in practice, our protocol has an O(log n)
amortized time overhead and an O(1) space over-
head. Moreover, our experiments show that this pro-
tocol would be effective in practice. If pseudorandom
hash functions are not to be used, then we show that
our protocol can be adapted to have an overhead of
O(log2 n).
There are several directions for future work, includ-
ing the following:
• Our protocols assume that the manager of the
data repository, Bob, is honest-but-curious.
– Can our schemes be efficiently adapted to
the case where Bob is only semi-trusted?
– Can we efficiently handle a situation where
Bob acts maliciously against some users?
– Can we prevent Bob from performing a re-
play attack on some users using old versions
of his memory?
• Our protocols also assume that the members of
the group of cooperating users are all trusted.
– What if some of the members of the group
are malicious?
– What if some of them collude with Bob to
try to reveal the access patterns of other
users?
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